Reviewed against RPL Sec. 339-u (by-laws shall provide for quorum and voting

New York Condominium Quorum & Supermajority Calculator — RPL Sec. 339-u Quorum, 339-v Amendments, 339-t Termination

Compute whether a New York condominium unit-owner vote has reached quorum and the votes-required-to-pass threshold under the New York Condominium Act (RPL Article 9-B, Sec. 339-d through 339-kk): RPL Sec. 339-u (by-laws-governed quorum and voting; 51% practical NY default); RPL Sec. 339-v(2)(a) (by-laws amendment 66 2/3% of common interest default); declaration amendment (66 2/3% practical NY standard); RPL Sec. 339-t (building termination / removal from condominium status — unanimous baseline with 80% destruction exception). Returns the effective quorum, votes required, quorum-met flag, and outcome (passed, failed, pending, or no-quorum).

Calculator

Adjust the inputs below; the result updates instantly.

Membership

Total unit owners

Attendance

Unit owners attending in person

Unit owners represented by valid proxy

Vote

Vote type

The type of vote being conducted. Each type has a distinct threshold: regular (majority of quorum); by-laws amendment (66 2/3% of common interest under RPL Sec. 339-v(2)(a)); declaration amendment (66 2/3% practical NY standard); special assessment (by-laws specification, 51% practical default); building termination (unanimous baseline under RPL Sec. 339-t with 80% destruction exception).

By-laws overrides

By-laws-specified quorum (%)

By-laws / declaration-specified supermajority (%)

Tally

Yes votes cast (for the measure)

No votes cast (against the measure)

Verdict

MEASURE PASSED. Quorum met (55 of 51). 45 yes votes meet or exceed the 29-vote threshold (51.0% of quorum).

Outcome: PASSED — measure adopted
Quorum status: MET — 55 of 51 required
Effective quorum requirement: 51.0% = 51 unit owners
Total ballots counted toward quorum: 55
Threshold basis: 51.0% of majority of quorum
Total votes cast: 55
Summary: New York condominium quorum and supermajority analysis under the New York Condominium Act (RPL Article 9-B, Sec. 339-d through 339-kk) — RPL Sec. 339-u (by-laws-governed quorum and voting; no statutory minimum); RPL Sec. 339-v(2)(a) (by-laws amendment 66 2/3% default); RPL Sec. 339-t (building termination; unanimous baseline with 80% destruction exception). Total unit owners: 100. In person: 30; by proxy: 25. Total counted toward quorum: 55. Effective quorum: 51.0% (51% practical NY default) = 51 unit owners. Quorum met: YES. Vote type: regular unit-owner meeting vote (majority of quorum). Threshold: 51.0% of quorum = 29 yes votes required to pass. Tally: 45 yes, 10 no (total 55 cast). Outcome: PASSED. MEASURE PASSED. Quorum met (55 of 51). 45 yes votes meet or exceed the 29-vote threshold (51.0% of quorum).

Tools to go with this

Need an RPL Sec. 339-v(2)(a) by-laws-amendment ballot packet, a declaration-amendment proxy mailer, or an RPL Sec. 339-t termination resolution?

Fennec Press's New York condominium governance bundle includes the RPL Sec. 339-v(2)(a) by-laws-amendment ballot packet with the 66 2/3% common-interest compliance checklist, the declaration-amendment proxy and mailer aligned to typical New York City and Westchester / Long Island by-laws, the special-assessment ratification mailer with by-law-threshold guidance, the RPL Sec. 339-t building-termination resolution and unanimous-consent procedure, and the proxy-validation checklist with the 11-month default validity treatment.

Open Fennec Press New York HOA bundle→

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How this calculator works

This is a quorum-and-threshold validator for New York condominium unit-owner votes under the New York Condominium Act. Given the total unit owners, in-person attendance, proxy count, vote type, and any by-laws or declaration-specified overrides, it returns:

Whether QUORUM has been met (total attendance plus proxies compared against the effective quorum requirement under the by-laws or the 51% practical default).
The YES VOTES REQUIRED TO PASS for the vote type — 66 2/3% of common interest for by-laws amendments under RPL Sec. 339-v(2)(a), 66 2/3% practical standard for declaration amendments, 80% of common interest for building termination under the RPL Sec. 339-t destruction exception (unanimous baseline for non-destruction), 51% practical default for special assessments, and majority of quorum for regular votes.
The current OUTCOME (PASSED, FAILED, PENDING, or NO-QUORUM) based on the supplied vote tally.

Use the calculator before convening a unit-owner meeting to confirm the procedural framework, during ballot counting to validate the threshold, and after a meeting to memorialize the outcome in the secretary's minutes.

The relevant RPL / GBL statute

The New York Condominium Act lives at RPL Article 9-B, Sec. 339-d through Sec. 339-kk. The voting and quorum framework:

RPL Sec. 339-u — BY-LAWS CONTENT. The by-laws of the condominium shall provide for the matters specified in the statute, including (among others) the percentage of unit owners necessary to constitute a quorum at a meeting of unit owners. The statute does NOT impose a statutory minimum quorum — the by-laws control. The practical NY standard under CNYC / REBNY templates is 51% (majority of common interest), materially higher than UCIOA-state defaults.

RPL Sec. 339-v(2)(a) — BY-LAWS AMENDMENT. The by-laws may be amended by the affirmative vote of unit owners holding at least 66 2/3 percent of the common interest, unless the by-laws specify a different percentage. This is a TOTAL-COMMON-INTEREST threshold (not 66 2/3% of those voting). The by-laws may specify HIGHER (75% for unit-boundary amendments is common); the statutory floor cannot be lowered for amendments covered by the default.

DECLARATION AMENDMENT. The New York Condominium Act does NOT impose a statutory threshold for declaration amendments — the declaration's own amendment provisions control. The practical NY standard in CNYC / REBNY templates is 66 2/3% of common interest, matching the by-laws-amendment threshold. Some declarations require 75% or unanimous consent for amendments affecting unit boundaries, common-element allocations, or unit voting rights.

RPL Sec. 339-t — REMOVAL FROM CONDOMINIUM STATUS / TERMINATION. The unanimous-consent baseline: all unit owners AND all mortgagees of record on individual units must agree by duly recorded instrument to remove the property from condominium status. The statute provides an 80%-common-interest threshold in cases of destruction or substantial damage where reconstruction is impractical. This is materially higher than UCIOA termination thresholds (Connecticut 80% under CGS Sec. 47-237; California 75%) and makes non-destruction building terminations essentially impossible in New York without a developer buy-out.

RPL Sec. 339-m — BUDGET ADOPTION. The board of managers adopts the annual budget. Unlike UCIOA states (e.g., Connecticut's CGS Sec. 47-261b inverse-vote ratification mechanism), New York does NOT use an automatic-ratification model — the board adopts and the unit owners do not vote on the budget unless the by-laws require it. Special assessments above by-laws thresholds typically trigger owner approval.

RPL Sec. 339-bb — APPORTIONMENT OF COMMON CHARGES. Common charges are apportioned by common interest specified in the declaration.

NY-specific gotchas (judicial foreclosure only, AG offering-plan supervision, no Surfside-style reserve mandate)

NO STATUTORY QUORUM MINIMUM. RPL Sec. 339-u defers entirely to the by-laws. There is no statutory floor — if the by-laws specify a 25% quorum or a 75% quorum, that controls. The practical NY standard under CNYC / REBNY templates is 51% (majority of common interest), but boards must always pull the actual percentage from the by-laws rather than assuming the calculator default.

66 2/3% IS A TOTAL-COMMON-INTEREST THRESHOLD. A by-laws amendment requires 66 2/3% of TOTAL common interest, not 66 2/3% of voters. In a 100-unit condominium with 80% turnout, even 100% yes votes only yields 80% of common interest — well above the 66 2/3% threshold. But if turnout is 60% with 80% yes among voters, that's 48% of common interest — well short of the 67-vote threshold. Boards routinely confuse the two and announce failed amendments as passed.

UNANIMOUS CONSENT FOR BUILDING TERMINATION. RPL Sec. 339-t requires unanimous consent of all unit owners AND all mortgagees of record on individual units for removal from condominium status outside the destruction exception. This is essentially impossible to achieve in a large condominium and effectively makes building terminations a developer-buy-out negotiation rather than a vote.

AG OFFERING-PLAN SUPERVISION SHAPES BY-LAWS CONTENT. The Attorney General's Real Estate Finance Bureau supervises the original offering plan and any subsequent amendments under GBL Article 23-A. Material changes to the by-laws (and especially to declaration provisions affecting unit ownership) may require AG amendment-plan filings. While this doesn't change the quorum/supermajority math, it constrains the substantive changes boards can make through the amendment process.

JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ONLY — INDIRECT IMPACT ON VOTING. Because New York condominium common-charge collection is slow (24-36 months for a typical NYC foreclosure under RPAPL Article 13), units in long-running foreclosure may have ambiguous voting rights pending the sale. Boards should establish clear by-laws procedures for voting rights of units subject to lien foreclosure.

NO SURFSIDE-STYLE RESERVE MANDATE. Unlike Florida (FL Stat. Sec. 718.112 post-Surfside reserve requirements) and California (Cal. Civ. Code Sec. 5550), New York imposes no statutory minimum on condominium reserve funding. Reserve studies and special-assessment votes follow by-law requirements only.

PROXY VALIDITY DEFAULTS TO 11 MONTHS. Most NY condominium by-laws follow the 11-month proxy validity standard. Proxies older than 11 months are generally invalid. Boards conducting amendment campaigns should refresh proxies before consequential votes.

INVERSE-VOTE BUDGET RATIFICATION DOES NOT EXIST. Unlike UCIOA states like Connecticut (CGS Sec. 47-261b), New York does not use an inverse-vote budget mechanism. The board adopts the budget under RPL Sec. 339-m; unit owners do not vote on the annual budget unless the by-laws require it. Special assessments above by-laws thresholds trigger owner approval.

What this calculator does NOT model

The calculator implements the QUORUM-AND-SUPERMAJORITY math under the New York Condominium Act. It does NOT:

Model the AG amendment-plan filing requirements under GBL Article 23-A for material changes to the offering plan / declaration / by-laws.
Validate the form of proxies (signature, witness, expiration, delegation chain).
Model common-interest-weighted voting where votes are not allocated one-per-unit (treat the totalUnitOwners input as common-interest votes for accurate weighted math).
Account for the unanimous-mortgagee consent requirement under RPL Sec. 339-t for non-destruction building termination (the calculator uses 80% as the destruction-exception threshold).
Model board-election procedures under the by-laws (typically by plurality or majority of those voting, with specific procedures in the by-laws).
Model board-removal procedures under the by-laws (no specific RPL provision; by-laws control).
Validate compliance with by-laws notice requirements that gate the meeting.

For any consequential vote, retain New York counsel with condominium-governance experience to oversee the procedural compliance review.

Sources

Last reviewed: 2026-05-16 against:

RPL Article 9-B (New York Condominium Act, Sec. 339-d through Sec. 339-kk).
RPL Sec. 339-u — by-laws governing quorum and voting.
RPL Sec. 339-v(2)(a) — by-laws amendment 66 2/3% of common interest default.
RPL Sec. 339-t — removal from condominium status; unanimous baseline with 80% destruction exception.
RPL Sec. 339-m — annual budget adoption by board of managers.
RPL Sec. 339-bb — apportionment of common charges by common interest.
GBL Article 23-A (Martin Act) — Attorney General Real Estate Finance Bureau offering-plan and amendment-plan supervision.
Council of New York Cooperatives & Condominiums (CNYC) and Real Estate Board of New York (REBNY) by-laws templates and practitioner materials.

RPL Sec. 339-u does NOT impose a statutory minimum quorum — the by-laws control. Under typical New York condominium by-laws (CNYC and REBNY templates widely used in NYC), the practical default is a MAJORITY OF COMMON INTEREST (51%), materially HIGHER than UCIOA-state defaults like Connecticut's 20% under CGS Sec. 47-251(a). Some older New York condominium by-laws specify 66 2/3% (two-thirds). The calculator uses 51% as the fallback when no by-laws percentage is supplied. Pull the actual quorum percentage from the by-laws if available — quorum errors are a frequent source of post-vote challenges.

RPL Sec. 339-v(2)(a) requires by-laws amendments to be approved by the affirmative vote of unit owners holding at least 66 2/3 percent of the common interest, unless the by-laws specify otherwise. This is a TOTAL-COMMON-INTEREST threshold — 66 2/3% of all common interest, not 66 2/3% of those voting. A 100-unit condominium with one vote per unit needs 67 yes votes to pass a by-laws amendment regardless of how many vote. By-laws may specify a HIGHER threshold (commonly 75% for amendments affecting unit boundaries or common-interest allocations); they cannot specify lower than 66 2/3% for amendments covered by the statutory default. Boards routinely under-estimate the difficulty of reaching 66 2/3% of common interest and should mobilize proxies aggressively.

The New York Condominium Act does NOT impose a statutory threshold for declaration amendments — the declaration's own amendment provisions control. The practical NY standard adopted in most CNYC and REBNY declaration templates is 66 2/3% (two-thirds) of common interest, matching the by-laws-amendment threshold. Some declarations require 75% or unanimous consent for amendments affecting unit boundaries, common-element allocations, or unit voting rights. Always pull the declaration's actual amendment provisions before structuring the ballot — assuming 66 2/3% when the declaration requires unanimous consent is a costly procedural error.

RPL Sec. 339-t imposes a UNANIMOUS-CONSENT baseline for removing property from condominium status: all unit owners AND all mortgagees of record on individual units must agree by duly recorded instrument. The statute permits an 80% common-interest threshold in cases of DESTRUCTION OR SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE where reconstruction is impractical. The unanimous baseline is materially higher than UCIOA termination thresholds (Connecticut's 80% under CGS Sec. 47-237). This makes building-termination votes essentially impossible in non-destruction cases — practical termination requires a developer buy-out of every unit and every mortgage. The 80% destruction exception is the realistic threshold in damage-recovery scenarios. The calculator uses 80% as the building-termination default but flag both paths to the user.

The New York Condominium Act does NOT impose a statutory threshold for special assessments — RPL Sec. 339-m gives the board authority to adopt the annual budget but the by-laws specify the procedure for special assessments. Typical NYC condominium by-laws require unit-owner approval for special assessments above a threshold (commonly 5%-10% of the annual budget, or a fixed dollar amount). The approval threshold is typically a simple MAJORITY of common interest (51%) but some by-laws require 66 2/3% for large or capital special assessments. The calculator uses 51% as the practical default; override with the by-laws specification. Local Law 11 facade-repair special assessments in NYC are a common trigger for owner approval votes given the size of the assessments.

Yes. RPL does not prohibit proxies, and typical NYC condominium by-laws explicitly permit them. A valid proxy: (a) is in writing; (b) is signed by the unit owner; (c) names a specific proxy holder; (d) is delivered to the secretary before the meeting starts; (e) has not been revoked. The New York standard proxy validity is 11 MONTHS from execution unless the proxy or by-laws specify otherwise — proxies older than 11 months are generally invalid even if all other elements are met. Proxies marked for a specific issue (directed proxies) vote only on that issue; general proxies vote on all items in the proxy holder's discretion. For 66 2/3% common-interest votes (by-laws and declaration amendments), aggressive proxy campaigns are typically necessary to reach the threshold.

OF TOTAL COMMON INTEREST means the threshold percentage applies to ALL common interest in the condominium regardless of attendance. RPL Sec. 339-v(2)(a) by-laws amendments (66 2/3%) and RPL Sec. 339-t building termination (80% destruction; unanimous baseline) both use this denominator. OF QUORUM means the threshold percentage applies to the votes actually present (or counted). Regular governance votes use this denominator. The two thresholds produce different outcomes when turnout is low. In a 100-unit condominium with 60% turnout (60 voters): an OF-TOTAL-COMMON-INTEREST by-laws amendment needs 67 yes votes (impossible without near-perfect turnout AND near-unanimous yes); an OF-QUORUM regular vote needs 31 yes votes (a clear majority of the 60 voters). Confusing the two is the most common voting-threshold error in NY condominium practice.

New York's condominium voting thresholds are generally MORE OWNER-PROTECTIVE than UCIOA states. The 66 2/3% by-laws-amendment threshold is HIGHER than Florida's 50% (FL Stat. Sec. 718.110(1)) and somewhat lower than Connecticut's 67% (CGS Sec. 47-236(a)). The unanimous-consent baseline for building termination under RPL Sec. 339-t is MATERIALLY HIGHER than Connecticut's 80% (CGS Sec. 47-237) or California's 75% — making New York building terminations essentially impossible outside the destruction exception. The 51% practical quorum default is materially HIGHER than Connecticut's 20% default and reflects the New York preference for substantial-participation governance. Practitioners moving between New York and other states should expect these threshold differences to surface in every governance vote.

No. The 66 2/3% common-interest threshold under RPL Sec. 339-v(2)(a) is harder to reach than most boards anticipate. In a 100-unit condominium with 80 voters returning ballots (80% turnout, which is excellent), 53 yes votes (66 2/3% of voters) is only 53% of common interest — well short of the 67-vote threshold and the amendment FAILS. Boards routinely announce by-laws amendments as passed based on majority-of-voters math; this is wrong. The calculator distinguishes the two thresholds explicitly to prevent this error. For consequential amendments, retain New York counsel to oversee the ballot count and threshold verification.

If quorum is not met at the noticed meeting, the meeting cannot take official action. Two options: (a) ADJOURN AND RECONVENE — the meeting may be adjourned and reconvened at a later date with proper notice; some NYC by-laws specify reduced-quorum procedures for the reconvened meeting (commonly 33% or lower for the second attempt). (b) RESCHEDULE THE FULL MEETING — re-notice the meeting and try again with more aggressive outreach and proxy collection. The calculator flags NO-QUORUM outcomes so the secretary knows the measure cannot be reported as passed even if a majority of those present voted yes. The 51%-quorum default in many NYC by-laws means a typical NYC condominium needs majority engagement to do anything substantive — which is one reason vote-by-mail and electronic proxy collection have become routine in larger NYC buildings.

Resources

Links marked sponsoredmay earn The Fennec Lab a commission. They do not affect the calculator's output. See disclosures.

New York State Senate — RPL Sec. 339-u (by-laws content) — RPL Sec. 339-u — by-laws governing quorum and voting
New York State Senate — RPL Sec. 339-v (by-laws amendment) — RPL Sec. 339-v(2)(a) — by-laws amendment 66 2/3% of common interest default
New York State Senate — RPL Sec. 339-t (termination) — RPL Sec. 339-t — removal from condominium status; unanimous baseline; 80% destruction exception
Council of New York Cooperatives & Condominiums (CNYC) — CNYC — practitioner reference for New York condominium governance and by-laws templates
Real Estate Board of New York (REBNY) — REBNY — New York City real estate industry practitioner materials