Nevada HOA Super-Priority Lien Calculator

How this calculator works

This is a screening tool that allocates a Nevada community-association lien into its super-priority and sub-priority pieces under NRS 116.3116(2)(b). The super-priority piece is the nine-month assessment carve-out that is senior to the first deed of trust. The sub-priority piece is everything else in the lien — assessments above the nine months, late fees, fines, interest, collection costs, and attorney fees — and is junior to the first DOT. The calculator reports both dollar figures, the total lien, the super-priority piece as a percentage of the first-mortgage balance, the loan-to-value, the equity cushion, and an extinguishment-risk band informed by the SFR Investments line of Nevada Supreme Court decisions. For the procedural timing of a nonjudicial foreclosure of the super-priority piece, use the companion Nevada HOA Foreclosure Timeline Calculator.

The relevant NRS 116 statute

NRS Chapter 116 is Nevada's adoption of the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act. It governs every condominium, planned-community, and cooperative association in the state. NRS 116.3116(1) creates an automatic statutory lien for unpaid assessments — no recording required to attach, although recording a notice of delinquent assessment is the practical first step of the collection procedure. NRS 116.3116(2) establishes the general rule that the association lien is subordinate to a first security interest. NRS 116.3116(2)(b) creates the famous carve-out — the lien IS prior to a first security interest "to the extent of the assessments for common expenses based on the periodic budget adopted by the association . . . which would have become due in the absence of acceleration during the 9 months immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce the lien."

NRS 116.3116(3) requires the association to keep SEPARATE ACCOUNTINGS of the super- and sub-priority pieces. The separation matters at the moment of tender by the first mortgagee, at the moment of foreclosure-sale surplus distribution, and at any judicial review of the foreclosure-sale conduct.

SFR Investments and the super-priority doctrine

The doctrine that made Nevada the most-litigated super-priority jurisdiction in the country traces to SFR Investments Pool 1 LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 130 Nev. 742, 334 P.3d 408 (2014). The Nevada Supreme Court held — over the objection of the institutional mortgage industry — that a properly conducted nonjudicial foreclosure of the NRS 116.3116(2)(b) super-priority piece EXTINGUISHES the first deed of trust on the unit. The reasoning is straightforward property-law doctrine: the super-priority piece is a senior lien; a foreclosure of a senior lien extinguishes junior interests; the first DOT is a junior interest as to the super-priority piece by operation of NRS 116.3116(2)(b); therefore the first DOT is extinguished at the association sale. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to disturb the holding.

The decision launched a generation of investor activity. Specialized funds (the original SFR Investments Pool 1, Saticoy Bay LLC, and many others) bid on Nevada association foreclosure sales for cents on the dollar, took title free of the first mortgage if the mortgagee failed to tender, and either occupied, rented, or resold the units. The institutional mortgage industry responded with a wave of litigation testing every available defense — due-process notice, federal preemption under the Federal Foreclosure Bar (12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3)) for Fannie- and Freddie-backed loans, equitable tender, and bona fide purchaser doctrine.

The follow-on holdings have refined the picture. Bourne Valley Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, 832 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2016), held that the opt-in notice scheme under the pre-2015 version of NRS 116.3116 was constitutionally deficient — a holding the Nevada Supreme Court has subsequently limited. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 350 Durango 104 v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, 388 P.3d 970 (Nev. 2017), largely rejected federal preemption defenses. SFR Investments Pool 1 v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 422 P.3d 1248 (Nev. 2018), held that a valid unconditional tender of the super-priority piece PRESERVES the first DOT — the defensive playbook for the institutional mortgagee.

The result: the core SFR Investments extinguishment rule still controls, the first mortgagee has a clear defensive path (tender the super-priority piece in time), and the institutional servicing failure mode is detecting the association foreclosure action at all.

Key thresholds

Three numbers drive every super-priority conversation.

Nine-month super-priority cap. Under NRS 116.3116(2)(b), the super-priority piece is the unpaid assessments that would have come due during the nine months immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce the lien, computed under the periodic budget. For a $300 monthly assessment, the cap is $2,700. For a $600 monthly assessment, $5,400. The cap is the MAXIMUM, not a floor — if the owner is only three months delinquent, the super-priority piece is the actual three-month figure, not the nine-month maximum.

Loan-to-value at 80 percent. Above this LTV, the extinguishment-risk band reads as elevated because the first mortgagee's incentive to tender the super-priority piece is sharpest. Below 80 percent, the rational mortgagee tenders without much hesitation; above 80 percent (and especially upside-down), the mortgagee may calculate that the loss-on-tender of the super-priority piece exceeds the loss-on-walk of the DOT itself, particularly if the property is in declining-market territory.

Super-priority as 10 percent of mortgage balance. When the super-priority piece is 10 percent or more of the first-mortgage balance, the calculator reports extinguishment risk as low — the piece is large enough that no rational mortgagee will let it foreclose. The typical super-priority piece is 1 to 3 percent of the mortgage balance; the 10 percent threshold rarely triggers but is informative when it does.

Worked example 1: typical first-time delinquency

A condominium unit owner has missed twelve months of assessments at $300 per month. The association periodic budget reflects $300/month per unit. There are $250 in late fees, $200 in interest, and $2,000 in estimated collection and foreclosure costs through nonjudicial sale. The unit's first mortgage balance is $200,000 and the FMV is $250,000.

• Nine-month super-priority cap: $300 times 9 equals $2,700.
• Total unpaid assessments: $300 times 12 equals $3,600.
• Super-priority piece: lesser of $2,700 cap or $3,600 owed equals $2,700.
• Sub-priority piece: ($3,600 minus $2,700) plus $250 plus $200 plus $2,000 equals $3,350.
• Total association lien: $2,700 plus $3,350 equals $6,050.
• Super-priority as percent of mortgage: $2,700 divided by $200,000 equals 1.35 percent.
• LTV: $200,000 divided by $250,000 equals 80 percent.
• Equity cushion: $250,000 minus $200,000 equals $50,000.
• Extinguishment-risk band: moderate — LTV at the elevated threshold; super-piece small relative to mortgage; rational first mortgagee should tender but historically many servicers have missed the action entirely.

A first mortgagee servicer that detects the association notice of default and election to sell in time can wire $2,700 to the association or its foreclosure trustee, document the tender contemporaneously, and preserve the full $200,000 deed of trust. The cost-benefit is a no-brainer at this level; the historical problem is detection.

Worked example 2: three-month delinquency, cap does not bind

Same condominium unit as worked example 1, but the owner is only three months delinquent. No late fees, $50 of interest, $1,500 of pre-foreclosure collection costs.

• Total unpaid assessments: $300 times 3 equals $900.
• Super-priority piece: lesser of $2,700 cap or $900 owed equals $900.
• Sub-priority piece: zero (no assessments above the nine-month window, since all are within it) plus $50 plus $1,500 equals $1,550.
• Total association lien: $900 plus $1,550 equals $2,450.
• Extinguishment-risk band: moderate, same as worked example 1.

The first mortgagee tenders $900, not $2,700, to preserve the DOT. The cap is the MAXIMUM amount that can be super-priority, not a fixed transfer.

Worked example 3: upside-down property, elevated extinguishment risk

A planned-community unit owner has missed twenty-four months of assessments at $500 per month, accumulating $12,000 of unpaid assessments. The unit's first mortgage is $280,000 against an FMV of $245,000 — upside-down. Late fees $750, interest $1,200, collection costs $3,500.

• Nine-month super-priority cap: $500 times 9 equals $4,500.
• Super-priority piece: lesser of $4,500 cap or $12,000 owed equals $4,500.
• Sub-priority piece: ($12,000 minus $4,500) plus $750 plus $1,200 plus $3,500 equals $12,950.
• Total association lien: $4,500 plus $12,950 equals $17,450.
• LTV: $280,000 divided by $245,000 equals 114 percent.
• Equity cushion: $245,000 minus $280,000 equals negative $35,000.
• Extinguishment-risk band: elevated — high LTV, non-positive equity cushion; the rational first mortgagee may strategically not tender, accepting the $280,000 DOT loss because the property is worth less than the loan anyway.

In the elevated-risk band, the association can plan for a contested post-sale aftermath: the first mortgagee may pursue every available defense (federal preemption for Fannie- and Freddie-backed loans, notice deficiencies, tender or excuse-from-tender), and the sale purchaser may face quiet-title litigation for months or years. The board and collection counsel should price the foreclosure path against the realistic post-sale recovery rather than the nominal lien total.

Worked example 4: free-and-clear unit, no extinguishment to worry about

A unit owner who paid cash for the unit (no mortgage) has missed six months of assessments at $400 per month, with $200 in late fees and $1,000 in collection costs.

• Super-priority piece: $400 times 6 equals $2,400 (less than the $3,600 nine-month cap).
• Sub-priority piece: $200 plus $1,000 equals $1,200.
• Total association lien: $3,600.
• Extinguishment-risk band: none — no first deed of trust to extinguish.

The super-priority distinction is moot for free-and-clear units; the entire lien recovers from sale proceeds in normal priority order. The calculator still surfaces the allocation for separate-accountings compliance under NRS 116.3116(3).

What this calculator does NOT model

This is a dollar-allocation screening tool. It does NOT compute the procedural timing of a nonjudicial foreclosure (use the Nevada HOA Foreclosure Timeline Calculator), does NOT evaluate tender sufficiency or excuse-from-tender doctrine, does NOT analyze federal preemption defenses under the Federal Foreclosure Bar for Fannie- and Freddie-backed loans, does NOT compute surplus distribution from a sale, and does NOT handle multi-unit or master-association cross-priority situations. It does NOT include maintenance and nuisance-abatement charges in the super-priority piece — the case law on whether NRS 116.310312 charges are super- or sub-priority has evolved and is matter-specific; the conservative reading implemented here treats them as sub-priority.

For any contested matter, the board, manager, and collection attorney should consult current Nevada case law and the latest Nevada Real Estate Division Office of the Ombudsman guidance before relying on the allocation. This calculator is a planning tool, not a legal opinion.

Sources

• NRS 116.3116(1) — automatic association lien for unpaid assessments.
• NRS 116.3116(2) — general subordination of the association lien to a first security interest.
• NRS 116.3116(2)(b) — the nine-month super-priority carve-out that IS senior to the first deed of trust.
• NRS 116.3116(3) — statutory requirement to keep separate accountings of the super- and sub-priority pieces.
• NRS 116.310312 — maintenance and nuisance-abatement charges (the inclusion-in-super-priority question).
• NRS 116.31162-116.31166 — Nevada nonjudicial foreclosure procedure.
• SFR Investments Pool 1 LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 130 Nev. 742, 334 P.3d 408 (2014) — the foundational extinguishment holding.
• SFR Investments Pool 1 v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 422 P.3d 1248 (Nev. 2018) — tender preserves the first deed of trust.
• Saticoy Bay LLC Series 350 Durango 104 v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, 388 P.3d 970 (Nev. 2017) — federal preemption defenses largely rejected.
• Bourne Valley Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, 832 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2016) — opt-in notice concerns subsequently limited.
• Nevada Real Estate Division — Office of the Ombudsman for Common-Interest Communities and Condominium Hotels.

Last reviewed: 2026-05-16 against the operative NRS 116.3116 text and the controlling Nevada Supreme Court precedent through Q1 2026.